

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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FAR EAST

Sihanouk's warm reception by the North Vietnamese leaders this week and the elaborate program arranged for his visit suggest that the Communists intend to keep him in world headlines. Hanoi's future tactics in Indochina in the wake of allied moves in Cambodia apparently include at least efforts to continue moving supplies south and to relieve allied military pressure in Cambodia by increasing attacks in South Vietnam.

The allied operations in Cambodia, which have kept the Communists in several areas on the run, have enabled the Lon Nol government to weather its second stormy month. The Cambodians are still a long way from being able to deal with the Communists on their own, and it is doubtful that they could soon effectively take the place of South Vietnamese troops. Phnom Penh is no longer under immediate threat from the south or east, but the Communists have been consolidating their hold on the northeast. Almost all the population centers there are in Communist hands, as is the Sekong-Mekong waterway, and the Communists undoubtedly hope to extend the Laotian infiltration corridor into this area.

In Laos, deteriorating weather has done much to slow the pace of

military activity, and no significant gains have been made by either side. Communist troops remain in control of Attopeu and continue to threaten the southern provincial capital of Saravane, perhaps hoping that, like Attopeu, it will be surrendered without a fight. In the north,

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
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Hanoi Ponders New Tack

The arrival of Sihanouk in Hanoi suggests that the North Vietnamese have made some preliminary decisions about their next moves in Indochina. They apparently had been preoccupied during the preceding two weeks with mapping out their future tactics in the wake of allied moves into Cambodia and party first secretary Le Duan's



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return from Moscow and Peking. The next few weeks should provide additional insights into just what those decisions entail.

Sihanouk's long-heralded visit to North Vietnam had to await the outcome of these policy deliberations, but he finally arrived in Hanoi on 25 May. Premier Pham Van Dong led the warm reception at the airport, and many other top leaders turned out for welcoming ceremonies. Hanoi media had been anticipating the visit for several days, and the elaborate programing suggests that in addition to policy talks the Communists intend to use the visit to keep Sihanouk in world headlines.

Last Phase of Spring Campaign in South Vietnam

The Communists' show of force last week was unimpressive despite reports that a larger, coordinated effort was in the works. Although over 50 bases and towns were shelled for three nights running and other harassing actions increased, this upsurge was not as heavy as the ones in the first days of April and May.

Many enemy units are still preparing for heavier combat in the near future while trying to cope with supply problems and the effects of recent allied operations. Some units near the Cambodian border may also plan to increase military action in South Vietnam in the hope of relieving the pressure of allied cross-border operations. In northwestern Phuoc Long Province, light shellings and allied clashes with small units early this week show an increased enemy presence.

Cross-Border Operations

Allied operations in Cambodia continue to uncover large amounts of rice and ordnance, but

through at least mid-week Communist forces still generally avoided combat and most enemy units probably escaped serious damage.

This is not true, however, of Communist units that normally operate in the area just west of Saigon, known as Communist Sub-Region 2 (SR-2). These forces have relied heavily upon the "security" of bases in the so-called Parrot's Beak of Cambodia, 30 miles west of Saigon, where recent allied operations have been quite successful. According to prisoners captured in these operations, the enemy had insufficient forewarning to take effective countermeasures and several units, including the SR-2 headquarters, were largely destroyed by the initial South Vietnamese attack on 29 April.

Thieu Seeking Ways to Ease Economic Problems

President Thieu, some weeks after first surfacing the idea, has now formally asked the National Assembly for limited tax-decree powers to deal with South Vietnam's economic difficulties. In submitting his request, he threatened that devaluation of the piaster might be necessary if the assembly failed to act. In fact, however, Thieu

hopes to avoid devaluation, fearing that the resulting price increases would spark a new wave of unrest worse than that which ensued after austerity taxes were imposed on imports last fall.

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The outcome of Thieu's ploy with the legislature remains in doubt, as there is likely to be considerable resistance to granting him decree powers, even on a limited basis. Meanwhile, as a result of the recent Supreme Court ruling that austerity taxes decreed last fall were unconstitutional, those taxes were allowed to lapse on 21 May, threatening a sharp drop in government revenue. In addition to the pending bill that would restore at least some of the taxes, the government has taken other measures to try to plug the gap.

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The War in Cambodia

The Lon Nol government has weathered a stormy first two months. Whatever hopes the Communists may have had of forcing it to seek a new accommodation or, failing that, to bring it down have been thwarted at least temporarily by allied operations. Prior to allied intervention, the Communists had made considerable progress in efforts to expand their border bases, to develop new infiltration routes from the Gulf of Siam, and to cut Phnom Penh's access to the south and east.

In the south, South Vietnamese forces have cleared the Communists from the towns they had either captured or were threatening, and they are now confined to the countryside, avoiding major fighting and adjusting to the new situation. Two of the major roads leading south from Phnom Penh are still not completely free of enemy harassment, but the road to Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) is open. Harassed from the rear and facing a number of the better Cambodian units as well as one well-trained Khmer Krom battalion, it

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Cambodia



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seems unlikely that the Communists will at this time develop a threat to Phnom Penh from this sector.

To the east of Phnom Penh, Route 1 is open to the South Vietnamese border, and the threat to Svay Rieng and Prey Veng provincial capitals has been substantially reduced. The Communists have been driven from Kompong Cham city and what is left of the Chup rubber plantation, and the road to the border has been opened by the South Vietnamese.

In the sparsely populated and rugged northeast, however, the Communists have had their own way. Almost all of the major population centers as well as the Sekong-Mekong waterway are in their hands. The Communists undoubtedly hope to develop this area into a new redoubt and to extend the Laotian infiltration corridor.

Even though the military outlook for the Lon Nol government has considerably improved, the Cambodians are a long way from being able to deal with the Communists on their own. If the South Vietnamese troops are withdrawn in the near future, it is highly unlikely that the Cambodians could effectively take their place. US and South Vietnamese troops have given Phnom Penh a much-needed respite and have created havoc with Communist plans, but the situation will still revert if the Cambodians do not continue to get outside support.

The political dimension of the struggle is also fraught with difficulty for the present re-

gime. The Lon Nol government came into power on a wave of anti-Sihanouk and anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Sihanouk is gone, but in addition to the 20,000-30,000 Vietnamese Communist troops on its territory, Phnom Penh now has some 30,000 South Vietnamese troops to cope with, and the war is now being fought through Cambodian villages and towns. The Cambodians despise the Vietnamese, and the South Vietnamese Army's performance in the Cambodian countryside has done nothing to heal old wounds. From the Cambodian point of view, the events of the last two months have been an almost unmitigated disaster.

Lon Nol has gotten himself into a borrand he knows it. Despite US plans to withdraw by 30 June, he and Deputy Prime Minister Matak evidently are still convinced that the US will keep Cambodia from going under—even if this means only exerting a restraining influence on Saigon. The alternative to faith in the US is the prospect of a Cambodia fought over and divided up by the Vietnamese and the Thai—an old Cambodian nightmare that all too quickly is becoming a reality.

The magnitude of the problems facing Cambodia apparently are only now beginning to sink in, and the support that Lon Nol and Matak enjoy in Phnom Penh and elsewhere has not yet been seriously eroded. The grumbling that has already appeared in Phnom Penh, however, will probably get louder as the country begins to realize how deeply it is involved with the war and the Vietnamese.


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Laos

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Rains Allow Few Gains

Deteriorating weather conditions in both north and south Laos have done much to slow the pace of military activity. No significant gains have been made by either side, although government irregulars have managed to retake site 38, an important guerrilla base on the southeastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau.



Communist forces remain in control of Attopeu town and continue to threaten the provincial capital of Saravane. So far, enemy units around Saravane have confined their activity to periodic rocket attacks and occasional clashes on the town's outskirts. It is possible that the Communists are playing a waiting game in the hope that Saravane, like Attopeu, will be surrendered without a fight. The Communists need hardly more than a battalion to overcome the 600 man town garrison.

In the north, government and enemy patrols have used the few breaks in the weather to jockey for position in the rugged terrain south of the Plaine des Jarres. Actions of the Communists in this region continue to suggest that they have gone on the defensive and probably do not intend to assault Long Tieng soon. General Vang Pao is hopeful that before the month is out he can retake the initiative in this area with a drive on the former government guerrilla base at Ban Na.

The situation at Bouam Long, the isolated government redoubt northeast of the Plaine, remained unchanged during the week. The concentration of enemy strength in this area suggests that, if the Communists have abandoned the idea of seizing Long Tieng for the time being, they may well decide to finish this year's dry season offensive by eliminating the government's position at Bouam Long.

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EUROPE

Moscow's restatement of its determination to stand by the Arabs is being underscored by its own increasing military involvement in Egypt, a trend that might bring on direct clashes with the Israelis. The Soviets reacted strongly to the visit to Washington last week of Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, labeling it "a new escalation of the Middle East war." Pravda claimed that Israel was likely to get the additional US jet fighters it has been seeking, even though the planes may be given secretly. At the same time, Moscow has remained silent on the arrest of numerous Communists in Syria and possibly of some in Egypt during recent weeks.

Two US destroyers completed a four-day deployment into the Black Sea on 23 May. There was little reaction by Bulgarian and Soviet naval and air units and there were no incidents of harassment. For the first time, a Soviet intelligence collector (AGI) conducted continuous surveillance of the US warships.

Looking toward the opening of the fourth round of the Polish - West German talks in Bonn on 8 June, Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski again touched base with Gromyko in Moscow on 25 May to get a reading on the Bahr-Gromyko talks. He probably also sounded out Moscow on the French proposal that the four wartime allies declare their readiness to incorporate into a future peace treaty any border accord reached by Warsaw and Bonn.

The Poles sent a parliamentary delegation to North Korea this week, headed by Zenon Kliszko, a politburo member and Gomulka's confident. It is likely that Kliszko will seek to bolster the Soviet bloc position in Pyongyang vis-a-vis Peking.

Flood waters, fed by new rains and melting snow, continue to spread and to threaten the Romanian cities of Galati and Braila. The USSR has belatedly promised aid. Flooding of some arable croplands in Romania probably will reduce production and hard-currency earnings from agricultural exports this year.

In Italy, the government has reached a truce with the labor confederations scheduled to last until the 7-8 June elections. Some strikes continue, but organized labor has suspended the staggered, country-wide strikes emphasizing worker interest in social and economic reforms.

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Romania-USSR

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Ceausescu-Brezhnev Talks in Moscow

Both Romanian party chief Ceausescu and Soviet party chief Brezhnev aired their grievances during their meetings in Moscow on 18-19 May, but it seems apparent that neither gave way on fundamental issues. Romanian Premier Maurer reportedly will head a government delegation in a follow-up visit this week to try to iron out the details of economic agreements reached last week.

Ceausescu's visit came as a surprise to most observers, but several Romanian and Soviet officials now claim that it was planned as long ago as last December. In any event, the timing of the visit—in the midst of disastrous floods in Romania—indicates that it was of more than routine importance. Since Ceausescu's return, the trip has been almost ignored in both Romanian and Soviet media, and the fact that it has been treated privately as a normal discussion of problems indicates at least tacit agreement to play down the substantial divergencies between Bucharest and Moscow.

There are only fragmentary reports concerning the details of the talks, and none from sources considered objective. A Romanian diplomation Moscow told US officials that Ceausescu for his part objected to the USSR's economic treatment of Romania, particularly in deliveries of raw materials. Although indicating that the Soviets had agreed to talk about establishing quotas for delivery of various, unspecified products, the source expressed pessimism about the outcome of Maurer's forthcoming negotiations. The Soviets, he said, had referred to the "many obligations" they already have. The USSR has refused to increase supplies of raw materials to its other allies because of its own economic problems, and it is

highly unlikely that the Romanians will fare better.

According to the same source, the Romanian party delegation-presumably in response to Soviet attacks-also faulted the Soviets on other topics, alleging unfair treatment in Soviet media of Romania's domestic achievements and its foreign policy. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, objected to Romania's independent stance on the Middle East and its unilateral initiatives on European security and disarmament. Although the source did not say so, the Soviets probably also denounced Romania's failure to cooperate in the Warsaw Pact, its refusal to join the recently established CEMA investment bank, and its recognition of Sihanouk's Cambodian government-inexile. Romania is the only Warsaw Pact member to recognize Sihanouk's government.

In the wake of the Ceausescu visit, unconfirmed rumors are once again floating that the long-delayed treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation is about to be signed. A Soviet source has mentioned June as the time, and a Romanian has said that the Soviet leaders "very probably" will go to Bucharest in July. The latter source stated flatly that the recently signed Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, which incorporated the essence of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine and implied defense obligations outside Europe, would have no bearing on the Romanian treaty. There are probably many in the Soviet leadership, however, who believe that the Romanian treaty should be altered to reflect more closely the evolution of events in the Communist world since it was drafted and initialed in 1968. Thus, prospects that the pact will be signed remain uncertain.

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Yugoslavia's Kardelj Gains New Stature on Latin Tour

Yugoslav leader Edvard Kardelj arrived back in Belgrade on 24 May after scoring a personal success on a three-week official visit to Chile, Peru, and Mexico. During the tour Kardelj acted and spoke with the authority usually associated only with Tito, thus adding weight to continuing speculation that he is Tito's personal choice to lead the country once the still hearty but aging leader leaves the scene. Kardelj is a leading member of the Yugoslav Communist Party's innergoverning body and is popularly known as the father of the decentralized, "self-management" system Tito has successfully applied in Yugoslavia since his break with Stalin in 1948.

Kardelj's trip reflects Yugoslavia's growing interest in Latin America, not only for purposes of trade, but also as an area from which to win new adherents to nonalignment. His talks with Chilean President Frei covered a wide range of bilateral and international topics. Kardelj expressed Belgrade's concern over Moscow's longrange intentions toward Eastern Europe and predicted that the USSR would take an increasingly hard line toward Romania and Yugoslavia. He further opined that Brezhnev would get tougher

with internal opposition and suggested that Moscow might return to an era of "Stalinist repression."

Kardelj criticized the US for its involvement in Southeast Asia—particularly Cambodia. He surprised his Chilean hosts, however, by taking a mild, even positive, attitude toward other aspects of American policy, such as the joint US-Chilean El Teniente copper venture.

The Peruvian Government paper El Peruano characterized Kardelj's visit as "the most significant event in the foreign affairs activity" of Lima since 1968, and Foreign Minister Mercado was highly laudatory of Belgrade's foreign policy as a "clear example of the serene attitude with which the nonaligned nations should act." Mexican President Diaz Ordaz

paid Kardelj the special courtesy of receiving the Yugoslav in his home. The two had a "cordial," hour-long talk on the possible expansion of Yugoslav-Mexican economic and political ties and on the nonaligned movement.

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Soviets Press Trade, Not Aid, in Latin America

Moscow continues at considerable expense to underwrite the Cuban economy, but is unwilling to assume similar burdens elsewhere in Latin America.

The Soviets have thus far failed to exploit recent opportunities to provide aid to Bolivia and Peru, limiting their economic moves to commercially feasible trade opportunities. After earlier

turning down a Bolivian offer to supply petroleum, Moscow recently made its first significant commercial arrangement by agreeing to a purchase of fin that could total between \$9 and \$13 million. Moscow also may provide some technical assistance to Bolivia's economy. In Peru, the Soviets have offered a \$30-million commercial credit for the purchase of Soviet agricultural machinery. Peru had been seeking Moscow's aid in financing a

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large share of a major irrigation project that could cost as much as \$400 million.

Although the Soviets clearly do not intend to throw their money around in Latin America, they are moving to develop more lasting trade ties. Moscow now is paying hard currency for more of its purchases, but it has made it known that it expects its Latin American trade partners to work toward eliminating persistent Soviet trade deficits. To increase its own exports, Moscow has sought to increase its trade representation in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay, and is trying to place trade missions in Venezuela and Costa Rica.

In spite of these efforts, Soviet trade with Latin America is expected to remain small and unstable. Total trade turnover last year amounted to only \$129 million, well below the peak of almost \$200 million in 1966. Coffee, hides, and, occasionally, wheat have been the only important Soviet imports. Purchases of other commodities fluctuate widely from year to year.

The size and composition of Soviet exports also have been irregular, reflecting the marginal position of the USSR in the Latin American market. The bulk has consisted of petroleum products, machinery, and transportation equipment, and some agricultural commodities and manufactured goods, most of which have been sold to government organizations.

Many Soviet sales and purchases involve large, nonrecurring transactions. Frequently, Latin American countries seek to unload surplus crops such as bananas or coffee. Although such deals often receive favorable publicity, and, on 25X1 occasion, pave the way for closer political relations, they seldom lead to sustained trade.

Soviet Census Suggests Future Labor Problems

Preliminary results of the 1970 Soviet census reveal that population growth during the 1960s declined to about 1.3 percent annually compared to an annual rate of 1.7 percent during the 1950s. Analysis of these statistics suggests that by 1980 the Soviet Union may face a serious manpower crunch.

Lower birth rates were largely responsible for the slowdown in population growth. The rate drop resulted from increased urbanization, high employment among women, housing shortages, the desire for a higher standard of living, and the fact that there are fewer women in the prime child-bearing ages. Population growth, however, varied greatly by republic, ranging from 11 percent for the RSFSR to 46 percent for Tadzhikistan. The sparsely settled Asian republics, with only 13 percent of the population in 1959, accounted for nearly 34 percent of the increase in population in the 1960s. Nevertheless, ethnic Russians remain the major nationality group.

The census also indicates that migration within and between republics was a significant factor in the pattern of growth. Moreover, population movement has not responded to official policies to rechannel it. In the remote areas of the Far East and Siberia, for example, growth stagnated while in the "overpopulated" North

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Caucasus growth has been more rapid than in any other part of the RSFSR.

Urbanization continued during the 1960s, but at a slower pace than in the previous decade. For the first time, urban residents outnumbered rural residents. Policies aimed at freezing the size of the population in large cities have not been successful. The census also confirmed that there is still a relative shortage of males, due to wars as well as to civil strife of the 1920s and 1930s.

The present slowdown in population growth rate provides the Soviet Union with some shortterm gains. Demands on the nation's resources for child-care facilities, schools, and some consumer goods will be lightened. Fewer children also mean less strain on the supply of housing and facilitate the regime's efforts to get women into the labor force.

In the long run, the declining birth rate may become a drag on the nation's economic growth. The annual rate of population growth between 1970 and 1985 is expected to be only about one percent. A manpower crisis is not imminent because the baby boom of the early 1950s will supply an increasing number of workers until 1976. By 1980, however, there will be a marked slowdown in annual increments to the labor pool.

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Portuguese Premier's Madrid Visit Promotes Iberian Ties

Premier Marcello Caetano's official visit to Madrid last week re-established the top-level personal contact that former Premier Salazar had maintained with General Franco. The visit was a successful public-relations exercise that brought few immediate results, but it may lead to closer Iberian cooperation.

To stress their fraternal ties, the two countries renewed the so-called Iberian Pact for another ten years. This involves the treaty of friendship and nonaggression signed in 1939 and a protocol concluded in 1940, which has been renewed every ten years. The new protocol provides that the foreign ministers will meet annually, or more often if required.

The most significant new development was the establishment of a permanent economic com-

mittee to provide a framework for coordinating policies on economic development. Economic cooperation, largely at the planning and technical levels, will be stepped up. The committee will study the problem of how to avoid needless competition within Iberia, with particular attention to the current negotiations for a preferential trade agreement between Spain and the European Communities (EC) and to Portugal's study of what arrangement with the EC might be feasible. Because EC association is a more remote goal for Portugal than for Spain, Lisbon, faced with the possible disintegration of the European Free Trade Association to which it belongs, may see advantages in trying for strengthened economic ties with Spain. Although the Spanish-Portuguese agreement on economic cooperation also covers trade promotion, Madrid may not be able to do much to improve its trading position with Portugal.

Several other agreements of lesser importance were signed in the fields of cultural and scientific exchange, social security, and the development of the Guadiana River areas in the south of both countries. In the cultural arena, both countries will try to promote a popular

understanding of their interrelated histories to overcome the distrust that the Portuguese and the Spanish generally have of each other. In this way the popular attitudes hopefully may be brought more into line with the official policy of promoting closer relations.

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Efforts Under Way to Strengthen UN

The 25th anniversary of the UN has set in motion a number of schemes to revitalize the organization, but the sensitive issues raised by some of them may prevent their adoption.

The Finns have received a favorable response to their proposal for periodic, closed meetings of the Security Council at the foreign-minister level. Such regular meetings would provide an opportunity for a general exchange of views on the international situation apart from any particular event or subject. Because the council would not be expected to reach decisions or resolutions on substantive issues, the vituperation that often accompanies public sessions of the council would, it is hoped, be toned down.

All council members except the Soviets—who are awaiting instructions from Moscow—have indicated approval of the Finnish initiative. The USSR is expected to endorse it, inasmuch as a similar proposal was a part of the "strengthening international security" package it offered at the General Assembly last fall. The first meeting of the council under this format will probably be held before the end of the year.

Also favorably received by the Western countries was the Canadian initiative on possible measures to improve working procedures in the assembly to make it a more meaningful organ.

They have agreed unanimously that a committee on the subject should be formed and should report to the fall 1971 session of the assembly. The UK is also supporting the suggestion of Lester Pearson, the former Canadian prime minister, that expert "wise men" be asked to draft specific proposals on assembly operations. The Soviets, however, are likely to resist any rapid changes, especially those that may boost the UN role in "nonpolitical" areas such as the promotion of science and technology in developing countries.

No solution appears in sight to the problems posed in recent years by the UN's burgeoning membership. The new members of the past decade-many of them small territories who have just gained independence—have distorted familiar voting patterns, and have pressed for large increases in the UN budget, to which they contribute very little. The US has proposed a category of associate membership-representation without voting rights or financial obligations-for future ministate candidates, and a special committee of the council is presently reviewing this idea. The Soviets do not support it, however, being chary of antagonizing the Africans, who regard the proposal as a colonialist scheme to combat the influence of developing nations at the UN. Potential candidates within the coming year include Bhutan, Fiji, Tonga, and Bahrain,

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Military activity along the Suez Canal was somewhat more restrained than usual this week. Exchanges of small-arms and artillery fire continued, however, as did Israeli air attacks against Egyptian targets along the western bank of the canal.

UN Secretary General Thant last week sent Cairo a note strongly protesting the recent artillery, mortar, and air attacks on a number of UN observation posts on the east bank of the canal. One more observation post is reportedly being closed—the seventh of the 18 original posts along the canal to be shut down in the past year. Thant may soon pull out a substantial number of the 100 remaining observers unless the Egyptian attacks are curtailed.

A violent clash on 22 May between workers and police in Dacca, East Pakistan, has resulted in at least 13 deaths and a public outcry against police repression. Bengali students demonstrated their continuing ability to generate mass political action by successfully carrying out a city-wide general strike and by drawing a crowd of some 100,000 persons at a rally protesting the incident and demanding the redress of grievances.

President Bourguiba, who returns to Tunisia on 1 June after undergoing medical treatment in France for more than six months, will be faced with the task of healing divisions within the political elite. These differences have been exacerbated by the prosecution of former economic chief Ahmed ben Salah, who last week was sentenced to ten years at hard labor for "treason and mismanagement of the economy." Even those who opposed the agricultural collectivization policy pushed by Ben Salah believe he is being made the scapegoat, and Bourguiba's prestige has been tarnished by the affair.

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Peripheral Issues Stir Arab States

Nasir's "Diplomatic Offensive" Continues

Nasir has continued the "diplomatic offensive" he set in motion after his May Day speech, but it seems to contain little new of substance. The envoys he dispatched to the Arab countries apparently presented no new proposals, and merely conducted a general exchange of views on Middle Eastern problems. The Egyptian Government also carried the campaign to some Western countries and sent to all the NATO ambassadors in Cairo an aide-memoire that reiterated Nasir's appeal for an Israeli withdrawal and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

Nasir's efforts are probably aimed at generating some form of political movement that could break the present impasse in the Middle East. He is also hopeful that he will be able to develop new pressures to deter the US from providing further aid—especially military—to Israel. In addition, the Egyptian President is concerned that the continued deterioration of the situation will lead to even greater strains in his contacts with the US, which he views as important in the light of the massive Soviet presence in his country.

Progress in Yemen War Settlement

The Yemeni Government has been expanded to include a number of influential royalist representatives in a major step toward final reconciliation of the eight-year-old civil war.

Former royalist foreign minister Ahmad Shami and an influential neutralist republican, Ahmad Numan, were appointed to an expanded five-man presidential council. Additionally, three

royalists were appointed to the cabinet, 12 to the National Council (a consultative body), and others were given governorships and ambassadorial posts.

Other problems remain to be overcome but the reconciliation appears to be proceeding smoothly at present. The Saudis have played a constructive and forceful role in the rapprochement, although they have not yet gone so far as to offer recognition or aid to the new regime.

More Troubles for Faysal

Saudi Arabia is currently grappling with several crises, both foreign and domestic, which have forced King Faysal to cancel a scheduled trip abroad.

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Gulf States Squabble over Oil

Other trucial states are involved in a second oil squabble concerning Abu Musa, one of several disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. The island is claimed by the trucial state of Sharjah; both Sharjah and the neighboring sheikhdom of Umm al-Qaiwan have granted oil drilling rights to separate US companies in the surrounding waters. Sharjah, however, extended its territorial waters from three to twelve miles in order to make its grant, and thereby impinged upon the continental shelf area of Umm al-Qaiwain.

Both are British-protected states, and the UK is attempting to solve the issue. Iran, however, also claims Abu Musa, regarding the island as essential to the defense of the Persian Gulf. The Shah not only views any drilling there as illegal, but also insists on being included in any negotiations. He can be expected to take forceful steps if settlement efforts fail.

Much Ado Reveals Little in Libya

The government of Libya and its policies remain an enigma, possibly because the inexperienced ruling body, the Revolutionary Command Council, is itself confused and undecided. On the oil scene, the government has continued to press hard in price negotiations with Western companies. It is backing its demands with direct action in other aspects of the industry, such as restricting production and insisting on moving up drilling schedules on new concessions. Although the council claims that its moves have no relationship to the price negotiations, the companies nevertheless view the tactics as coercive.

Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports continue to note flows of troops to and from Egypt, as well as the rumored imminent arrival in force of French training personnel. In the foreign field, Libya has been conferring with Algeria and Iraq on oil policy, and with Egypt and Sudan on possible tripartite cooperative measures. In sum, Libya appears still to be moving in a great many directions at once toward as yet undefined goals.

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Tunisia's Bourguiba Needs to Re-establish Regime's Credibility

When President Bourguiba returns to Tunisia on 1 June, he will be faced with the task of restoring the credibility of his regime and healing the divisions within the political elite that were exacerbated by the ouster and prosecution of former economic chief Ahmed ben Salah.

In an effort to recapture popular enthusiasm, Bourguiba has timed his return from a lengthy convalescence to coincide with the fifteenth anniversary of his triumphal return to Tunisia from imprisonment and exile in 1955. He has been in France undergoing medical treatment and resting for more than six months following a serious attack of hepatitis contracted a year ago. Bourguiba's appearance in the limelight will probably be brief, as he will have to pace his activities carefully over the next few months.

Heading the list of problems Bourguiba will face is the alienation of students and intellectuals over the treatment of former economic Czar Ben Salah, who was convicted last Sunday of treason and mismanagement of the economy. In a verdict directed by Bourguiba, Ben Salah was sentenced to ten years at hard labor, ten years of enforced residence, and the loss of civil and political rights.

Ben Salah, the driving force behind a highly unpopular policy of organizing all agricultural production into cooperatives, was ousted last September when it became clear that the program would be disastrous. The reversal of this policy met with enthusiastic approval by peasants and conservatives, but students and political liberals have bitterly criticized the vendetta against him. Even Ben Salah's foes are unconvinced by government efforts to make him the scapegoat, and they are mindful that Bourguiba himself had backed collectivization. The President's prestige has been badly tarnished by the affair and he may now bid for support by reducing Ben Salah's sentence.

Meanwhile, there has been an upsurge in competition among rivals of Prime Minister Ladgham, whom Bourguiba tapped last fall as his successor. Earlier this spring Bourguiba undermined Ladgham's position by publicly criticizing him for indecisiveness.

Foremost among those weighing their prospects vis-a-vis Ladgham is Mohamed Masmoudi, ambassador to Paris and protegé of Bourguiba, who apparently has taken advantage of Bourguiba's stay in France to fan the President's dissatisfaction with his prime minister. Another rival may be former defense minister Ahmed Mestiri, who resigned from the government and was expelled from the ruling Destourian Socialist Party more than two years ago because he was opposed to Ben Salah's policies. He has now been reintegrated into the party. He may be building a following in business and labor circles, and also may be renewing contacts within the military. Neither Masmoudi nor Mestiri has a substantial party following. The prime minister, however, as secretary general of the party, should be able to draw on it for support.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Organization of American States was in the limelight last week. Talks between representatives of Honduras and El Salvador are still being conducted in Washington under OAS auspices, and the foreign minister of Honduras has urged that they be extended. Should the two countries remain deadlocked on outstanding issues, however, a meeting of Central American foreign ministers may convene in Costa Rica next week. This meeting, however, was postponed twice during the past week.

Latin American governments are making plans for the first session of the OAS General Assembly, scheduled to be held in the Dominican Republic on 20 June. Opponents of President Balaguer, primarily Juan Bosch and left-wing extremists, are trying to embarrass the government by threatening demonstrations during assembly deliberations. The administration has committed its prestige to holding the meeting, however, and will make extensive security preparations to choke off disorders and guarantee the safety of participants. Several foreign ministers would like the conference to be held elsewhere, but they are not taking any initiative in the matter.

In Haiti, continued arrests stemming from the investigation of the Coast Guard revolt in April are keeping the armed forces uneasy. Thus far the purge has affected only middle levels, but there are rumors of a pending high-level shake-up.

Soviet naval units in Cuba conducted port visits to Havana and Cienfuegos this week. The ASW cruiser and destroyer that moved from Cienfuegos to Havana on 24 May now have gone back to sea. A submarine tender and three submarines should complete a two-week visit to Cienfuegos on 28 May.

The Ecuadorean Government appears to be winning its case for fiscal reform, as controversy over the tax decrees of 12 May abates. After an initial flurry of harsh words and threats of a general strike, Ecuador's principal economic interest groups have turned to the courts in an effort to have the decrees declared unconstitutional.

President Frei of Chile delivered the final state of the nation speech of his term on 21 May. He highlighted his agrarian reform and education programs, and pointed to inflation and the social security system as his two biggest failures. He specifically mentioned US assistance as having helped the development of Chile during the past six years. The US also came in for some kudos in Honduran President Lopez' last "state of the union" speech to his Congress this week.

Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera is to visit Washington next week. The visit is a good-will mission, but Caldera hopes to influence the US to grant Venezuela a larger share of the US oil market.

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Two Leftists Ousted from Panamanian Cabinet

Concerned by the government's continued financial problems and the need for foreign loans, General Torrijos has decided to remove from the cabinet two prominent leftists. This step appears to be mere cosmetic surgery, however, and is not indicative of a basic change in government policy.

Relations between President Lakas and the two leftists, Minister of the Presidency Vasquez and Minister of Labor Escobar, have been poor for some time. Vasquez and Escobar have been mainly interested in the government's "revolutionary image," and have concerned themselves with reform and with building popular support for the regime. Lakas, on the other hand, has seen as his major function the establishment of a dialogue between the government and the business community, and believed that the two ministers were undercutting his efforts to improve relations with the private sector.

General Terrijos has long been aware of the conflict but until recently tried not to become

involved. Concerned both with increasing popular support and with improving investor confidence, he realized the value of retaining all three men. Torrijos had another, more immediate concern, however. The government was growing short of funds, and in order to expand or even continue the economically and politically necessary public works program, additional foreign loans were essential. Lakas' argument that the presence in the cabinet of Escobar and Vasquez hurt the country's image abroad and frightened off foreign investors was therefore a compelling one and may have finally persuaded Torrijos to take action.

The cabinet changes do not foreshadow a shift to the right. Torrijos' enmity toward the local business community has not diminished; indeed, he has reportedly given up his attempt to win its favor. He does not appear to have lost confidence in either Escobar or Vasquez, and their influence has not been ended. Moreover, Torrijos probably will feel constrained to take steps in the near future to revalidate his reformist credentials.

Cuban Relations with Switzerland Deteriorate

The recent kidnaping of 11 Cuban fishermen by the exile group Alpha 66 and the subsequent anti-US demonstrations in Havana have strained relations between the Castro regime and the Swiss Government. The demonstrations were held in front of the former US Embassy, which is used by the Swiss to represent US interests.

The chief of Switzerland's Political Department, who was piqued at the "convenient" absence of Cuban diplomats in Bern during the demonstrations, held a news conference to

protest the harsh treatment of Swiss diplomats by the Cuban crowds. He also suggested that Castro encouraged the demonstrations in order to divert attention from the 1970 sugar harvest. 25X1

Havana responded by accusing the Swiss of "cynical identification" with US "aggression against Cuba," and also announced the recall of its ambassador to Bern. No reason was given for this action, and there was no indication of whether the ambassador would return. In a related development, the British news service

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correspondent left Cuba following an attack by Fidel Castro for his coverage of the kidnaping and the demonstrations.

This latest round of activity is a continuation of Castro's overreaction to the kidnaping and underscores his desire to keep the matter in the limelight. In his speeches last week, he threatened to withdraw permission for the Swiss to represent US interests, but stopped short of taking any action. His continued pressure on the Swiss may be an effort to induce them to relinquish this function voluntarily. Should that occur, Castro

would probably feel he was in a firmer legal position to take over the former US Embassy building.

It is more likely, however, that Castro is keeping his options open and is extracting maximum mileage from an opportune situation. By keeping the incident in the forefront, he can divert attention from the sugar harvest and continue his anti-US campaign simultaneously. Castro is probably waiting for reactions by the US and the Swiss before he makes any further moves.

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Argentina Prepares for Further Disorders

Student activities commemorating last year's bloody riots have already resulted in police and student clashes throughout Argentina, and the Ongania government is girding for the possibility of more disturbances this weekend.

On 21 and 22 May, student disturbances erupted in the country's two largest provincial cities—Rosario and Cordoba. No deaths resulted, but over 1,000 demonstrators were detained and tear gas and water cannon were necessary to quell the rioting students. The massive display of force and the widespread arrests were an obvious warning that the government would not tolerate a challenge to its authority.

Government sensitivity to charges of police overreaction led to the temporary closing of Buenos Aires' largest daily newspaper, La Cronica. The paper, which has a long record of irresponsibility, had claimed that one student was killed in Cordoba on 22 May. Although the police forcefully dispersed the student agitators, there is no evidence that they employed undue force. Since last year's bloody riots, the Ongania government has retrained the provincial police and is taking care to avoid the creation of martyrs. The death of a student last May touched off the series

of escalating disturbances that finally culminated in the bloody riots in which twenty one people were killed in the two days, and property damage was estimated in the millions of dollars.

Labor participation in this year's riots thus far has been minimal. In Cordoba, some workers joined in the student protests during working hours, but the vast majority ignored the demonstrations. As it prepares for another round of demonstrations, the Ongania government's principal concern is whether organized labor will lend its support as it did last year. In recent months the government has taken pains to assuage labor grievances, and unlike last year there are no outstanding issues at this time that could drive labor into the streets.

Although some Peronist unions in Cordoba have called for nationwide support for a 14-hour general strike on 29 May, there is no indication that national labor leaders will heed the call. Instead, their attention is being diverted to planning for a Labor Congress on 29-30 May. The congress will put the finishing touches on recent moves to reanify the Argentine labor movement, which the government is supporting.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report

Nigeria After the War

Secret

Nº 41

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NIGERIA AFTER THE WAR

With the civil war over and secession decisively defeated, the federal military government is now attempting the complex task of rebuilding Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. Winning the war in itself was a considerable achievement for General Gowon's government, but the basic problems that brought about the political upheaval in the first place remain unsolved. The old federal system, which was designed to accommodate the power relationships among the three main tribal groupings, was unable to cope with those problems. The elements now in control believe that this system was actually a major contributor to the political crisis. The new leaders, who are from small tribes, are determined to fashion a new structure that will prevent a return to big-tribe domination. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, but the men in charge are still feeling their way and probably remain unsure about the best way to achieve their objectives. In foreign affairs, the new Nigeria is clearly more nationalistic and assertive than its predecessor, although Gowon's government will probably continue to follow a pragmatic policy with no major departures. At the same time, the Nigerians are likely to remain suspicious of all foreign powers.

THE POSTWAR SITUATION

The federal army has remained in firm control of the former Eastern Region—the original secessionist territory—since the abrupt end of the war some four months ago. No guerrilla warfare has occurred, and the possibility of any developing is remote. Banditry, probably by exsoldiers, has increased recently in the southwestern part of the Ibo East Central State, but at present it does not seem likely that this will get out of hand. Most of the secessionist soldiers joined groups of refugees or returned to their villages when the war ended, while a large number of officers and noncommissioned officers turned themselves in to be screened for reabsorption into the army.

A large occupation force remains in the former secessionist territory, but these troops have been kept out of the main towns wherever possible. Most routine law-and-order functions are

carried out by the Nigeria Police, which include some reinstated Ibos.

By the time the war ended, the Nigerian Army had grown to some 200,000 men, among them many untrained recruits. Since then, there have been some violent incidents between army troops and civilians and police, mainly in the North. There has been vague talk of the need to demobilize, but the federal leaders are in no hurry to do so, and Nigeria is likely to have a relatively large standing army for some time to come.

The federal military government emerged from the war in a strong political position, with Gowon something of a national hero. At present, Gowon's leadership faces no serious challenge,

Although he has disavowed any personal political ambitions, all indications are that he intends to stick as head of the government until it is


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States and Tribal Groups of Nigeria



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returned to civilian rule—a move unlikely to occur for another two years or more. Gowon recently spoke of several time-consuming procedures, possibly including a census, that would have to precede the return. In early May, the federal government issued a decree formally placing itself above the law and prohibiting judicial review of any of its orders. This move was probably designed to remind the Nigerians of the absolute supremacy of the military government and to end any notion that the old civilian parliament might be revived.

Secessionist leader Ojukwu is in Ivory Coast, where he is seeking to keep an organization together. He has been in contact with the handful of other Biafran leaders abroad, some of whom have ambitious—albeit unrealistic—plans to influence events at home. Ojukwu probably retains support among many Ibo tribesmen in Nigeria, but there is virtually no likelihood that they would answer a call from him to renew the secession attempt. Unless the occupation suddenly takes a turn for the worse, which is unlikely, Ojukwu's political future will remain dim.

RECONCILIATION POLICY

At war's end, Lagos announced a conciliatory policy toward the secessionists, including the absorption of "misguided" army and police officers and the reinstatement of civil servants. Several thousand ex-Biafran policemen have already been reinstated, and some have been reassigned as far away as Lagos. A federal military tribunal has been established to screen army officers, but thus far none is known to have been reabsorbed.

The reintegration of eastern civil servants has also been proceeding, although at a slow pace. In

mid-May, a federal official announced that slightly over 1,000 had been formally reinstated; over half of these people were posted outside the East Central State, with nearly 200 going to four of the northern states. These represent the first group of easterners to return to the north, where over a million had lived before the war.

One federal program that has done much to convince the Ibos that Lagos was serious about reconciliation has been the food relief effort. The actual food situation in the three eastern states has never been accurately determined, but the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC) has been providing at least some food to 2-3 million people since shortly after the end of the war. The massive program was reduced this month, and the NRC's role may possibly end after June, at which time the remaining problem of food relief would be turned over to the state. State administrations are not as well organized as the NRC, and there will probably be an increase in malnutrition if the NRC is phased out. Whether the NRC will continue after 30 June has not yet been finally decided.

Although the East Central State has an Ibo civilian administrator, he was appointed by Gowon during the war and is probably regarded as a quisling by most Ibos. Moreover, many of the present local officials were either recruited during the war or were simply the first people to meet the advancing federal troops. Thus far, the Ibo tribesmen have been preoccupied with making the best of a difficult economic situation, and little dissatisfaction over the state administration is evident. At some point, however, Gowon may well see the political need to appoint officials more acceptable to the Ibo masses; such officials would have to include some who supported secession.

There are sizable elements within the government that oppose Gowon's conciliatory policy

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and believe the Ibos should be punished. In addition, the non-Ibo tribesmen now in control in Rivers and South Eastern states, as well as many northern tribesmen, are convinced that too much is being done for the former enemy. These elements seem to have persuaded Gowon of the need for a cautious approach to the reintegration of the Ibos, but it is unlikely that he would adopt a really vindictive policy.

THE ECONOMIC PICTURE

Apart from a troublesome price inflation and a somewhat precarious foreign exchange situation, Nigeria has emerged from the war in generally good economic condition. The federal government did not incur any external war debts, and what problems exist certainly seem manageable. On the plus side is the rise in oil production, which last April reached one million barrels per day, nearly double the prewar high. The rapid development of manufacturing industries outside the old Eastern Region is also promising.

In contrast with the rest of the federation, the three eastern states were economically prostrate at the end of the war. Production facilities were extensively damaged, many bridges were destroyed, and the electric power system required major repairs. A serious, immediate problem exists over the shortage of federal currency in the East Central State. The government has collected what it could of the now-illegal Biafran money, but it has not yet decided whether to effect an exchange with Nigerian currency. A considerable amount of federal money has been filtering into the East Central State as a result of spending by Nigerian Army troops, by relief officials, and by traders from other parts of the country.

Another major economic problem is caused by the fact that most of the Ibo tribesmen are crowded into the East Central State, which even before the war could not support them all. Some have returned to Lagos, Mid-Western, and Western states, and a small number have gone back to the north. Ibos are clearly unwelcome, however, in Rivers and South Eastern states, which are controlled by vehemently anti-Ibo tribes. This situation will slow the recovery of places such as Port Harcourt, which had been a predominantly Ibo city before the war. Thus far, failure to tackle the problem of what to do with the ambitious and generally well-educated Ibos has not caused widespread discontent among them, but their continuing restriction remains an element of potential instability.

GOWON AND HIS CONSTITUENCY

Federal leaders are aware of the economic and political problems of the three eastern states, but they view reconstruction in terms of the whole federation. Gowon and his closest associates are trying to use this period to reshape Nigeria's economic and political institutions to accommodate the profound transformation of power relationships that occurred as a result of Gowon's taking over the leadership in August 1966.

Nigeria had become independent six years earlier under a system designed to reflect the predominance of the country's three main tribal groupings—the Muslim Hausa-Fulanis of the north, the Yorubas of the west, and the Ibos of the east. At the same time, there were sizable numbers of minority tribesmen throughout the federation, particularly in the north and the east. In January 1966, the thoroughly corrupt civilian regime through which the big-tribe system functioned was destroyed in a coup d'etat by young, southern officers. Six months later, the succeeding Ibo-dominated military government was itself overthrown by northern army elements who turned to Gowon, the ranking northern officer,



for leadership. Gowon was not from the Northern Region's traditionally dominant Hausa-Fulani group but rather was a minority tribesman and a Christian.

Since taking over, Gowon has developed a powerful constituency among the many minority tribesmen whose leaders seized on his accession to power to secure their aim of ending the long domination by the three big tribes. Through their control of the army, these minority tribesmen now hold real power in the federal government, and they are determined not to give it up. The actual exercise of this power is carried out at the

federal level by Gowon and his small "kitchen cabinet" of civilian and military advisers, all of whom are either minority tribesmen or are in sympathy with them.

In May 1967, Gowon decreed the breakup of the four administrative regions of the federation into 12 states, a move clearly designed to dilute the power of the large tribes. This action, aimed particularly at freeing minority areas of the old Eastern Region from domination by the Ibos, triggered the declaration of secession toward which Ojukwu, who never recognized Gowon's leadership, had long been moving. Thus, to Gowon and his constituency, the federal victory in the war represents the completion of an internal revolution.

There is, of course, opposition to the minority tribesmen's objectives. The first generation of Nigerian politicians, whose careers were made in big-tribe politics, are by no means resigned to a secondary role. At this point, however, there is little they can do to change things. The most prominent and ambitious of these surviving firstgeneration politicians is Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yorubas. The aging Awolowo, however, has far too many enemies, including many among the minority tribesmen, to be considered a likely contender for leadership of an eventual civilian government. In northern Nigeria, a number of old-line Hausa-Fulani politicos have been holding meetings with some of their counterparts from local minority tribes to plan political strategy. This grouping now seems mainly to be trying to block Awolowo's accession to power. It does include some rich and powerful politicians, however, who are anticipating a return to civilian rule. The new state structure has also provoked opposition among traditional local leaders, particularly in the far north, who had considerable power under the old system.

THE 12-STATE STRUCTURE

Area	Area Sq. Miles	*Population Millions	Major Ethnic Groups	Comment
Kano	16,630	6,0	Hausa-Fulanis	Strong historical basis for unity; state boundaries approximate 19th century emirate of Kano; exceptional ethnic homogeneity.
North Western	65,143	6.0	Hausa-Fulani, Nupe	State capital of Sokoto traditionally was focus of religious and political allegiance of Muslim Hausa-Fulanis; Hausa-Fulani predominance in state administration resented by Nupe and other small tribes in south.
North Central	27,108	4.0	Hausa-Fulanis	Hausa-Fulani control of state administration opposed by non-Muslim tribes in south,
North Eastern	105,025	0,8	Kanuri, Hausa-Fulani	Kanuris, although Muslim, were never conquered by Hausa-Fulanis; small tribes make up approximately 50 percent of state population; this state may be split into two.
Benue-Plateau	39,204	4.0	Tiv, Idoma	Tiv and Idoma, although traditional rivals, both fear Hausa-Fulani domination.
Kwara	28,672	2.5	Yoruba, Igala, Igbira, Nupe	Yorubas predominate, but there are many ethnic groups and many resultant problems; minimal historical basis for political cohesion.
Western	29,100	9.5	Yoruba	As homogeneous as Kano state, but Yoruba tribe itself is factionalized.
Lagos	1,381	1.5	Yoruba	Coastal Yorubas and non-Yorubas share a high degree of cultural Westernization.
Mid-Western	14,922	2 . 5	Edo, Ibo, Urhobo, Ijaw	Edo tribesmen who now control state administration once made up famous Kingdom of Benin.
East Central	11,324	7.5	lbo	Solid Iboland; this mainly rural area became the stronghold of Biafran resistance during the war.
Rivers	6,985	1,5	ljaw	ljaws, who are strongly anti-lbo, control state administration; ljaw pre- dominance resented by smaller tribes.
South Eastern	11,175	3.5	Efik, Ibibio	Efik, who live near Calabar, assimilated Western culture more rapidly than Ibibio; northern sector inhabited by several small, isolated tribes,
Total	356,669	56.5		Turbio, northern sector innabited by several small, isolated tribes.

*Based on 1963 census, the results of which were inflated for political reasons. Although only very rough estimates, these figures do give some idea of the relative population of the states.

As far as Gowon and his constituency are concerned, however, the only question is whether more states should be created and, if so, how many. There is a good chance that the Western State, the homeland of the Yorubas and the power base of Chief Awolowo, will be broken up into two or perhaps three states. One faction of the Yoruba tribe wants this, but Chief Awolowo opposes it. Gowon does not like or trust Awolowo, however, and he will probably break up the Western State if only to undermine Awolowo. It is also possible that the North Eastern State and

perhaps some others will be split. The question of forming new states could, of course, be passed on to an eventual civilian government, but Gowon and his colleagues certainly realize that it could most easily be handled by decree; there are no signs that such a decree will be forthcoming in the immediate future, however.

Another thorny problem Gowon may want to settle by decree is that of a permanent formula for the distribution of federal revenue. Last March, the government implemented a revenue

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distribution scheme that moved toward a more equitable distribution of funds to all parts of the federation in place of the old system favoring the rich areas. There is a considerable disparity in resources among the 12 states, and it seems likely that Gowon will eventually ensure a revenue distribution system protecting the poorer states.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The government seems inclined to continue the basically pragmatic foreign policy adopted during the war. Federal leaders have not forgotten that they paid in full for all the military weapons they acquired from the Soviet Union. Since the war, Lagos has canceled orders from the USSR, and the military leaders have never been enthusiastic about expanding ties with the Communists. Nevertheless, the fact that some civilian elements want closer relations with the Soviets, and that even the military see the need for a friendlier attitude toward Moscow, could result in closer economic and cultural ties. Indeed, in late 1968, a general economic agreement was signed with the USSR setting the stage for future Soviet-aided projects. The Soviet Union has sent some technicians and geological experts to Nigeria but has not yet undertaken any economic aid projects.

The Nigerian Government remains favorably disposed toward the UK, but is suspicious of the US, which is generally believed to have given moral—if not material—support to the secessionists. Gowon wants correct diplomatic relations with the US however, and will probably continue to work to convince his colleagues that this is a wise course to follow.

Nigeria has shown some signs of adopting a more activist policy in Africa. Although the present government is unlikely to undertake any dramatic initiatives, Lagos could well step up its

propaganda and material support for black nationalist movements in southern Africa. Such support would fit well with the idea that Nigeria's military suppression of a foreign-backed attempt to divide Africa's largest country redounded to the advantage of the "Black Man," a recurrent theme in recent propaganda out of Lagos.

OUTLOOK

The Nigerians emerged from the war with a much-increased consciousness of national unity, and there is no reason to believe that this attitude will soon disappear. It is by no means certain, however, that the Gowon regime can make permanent structural changes in the federation to reflect the new-found power of the small tribes. The minority elements now in control of the army seem firmly entrenched there. They appear to know what it is they want but are not quite sure of how to go about it. At present, they are working toward a political system that would include a strong central government and at least the present 12 states. Power at the center would be designed mainly to protect the minority tribes from domination by the large tribes, but federal leaders will have to withstand pressures for the creation of more and more states to accommodate Nigeria's many small tribes.

The achievement of political stability in Nigeria is no easy task. All the forces contributing to instability—tribalism, regionalism, a plethora of scheming politicians, and endemic financial corruption—remain. Any future civilian government will have to deal with them, as well as with the Ibo problem, which admits of no easy solution. Although many difficulties remain, Gowon and his constituency seem determined to develop a workable political entity. Given a reasonable amount of luck, they just might be able to pull it off.

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